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I. INTRODUCTION
In a popular advertisement of the 1980's, former professional foot-
ball star O.J. Simpson would hurdle suitcases while going to his
Hertz rental car at the airport. Nowadays, he would probably hurdle
the collision damage waiver 1 (CDW), which is undergoing a siege of
legislative, bureaucratic, judicial, and public pressure for its regula-
tion.2 The attacks on the waiver come from the United States Con-
gress, 3 several state legislatures, 4 state attorneys general,5 state
insurance officials,6 state and federal courts, as well as consumer
groups and advocates.7 As a result, even some rental car companies
are now supporting CDW regulation.8
1. The term "collision damage waiver" is also known as a "loss damage waiver"
or a "physical damage waiver." Taylor, Insuring Against Trip Cancellation, L.A.
Times, Apr. 24, 1988, § 7, at 8, col. 1. While filling out car rental forms, a lessee can
elect or decline to obtain the collision damage waiver which is the lessor's waiver of its
right to look to the lessee for payment of collision-type damage. If the lessee accepts
the waiver, the risk of any collision-type loss is shifted from the lessee to the lessor.
Hertz Corp. v. Corcoran, 137 Misc. 2d 403, 520 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1987).
2. Diamond, Insurance Fees on Rental Cars Hit the Skids, L.A. Times, June 24,
1988, § 4, at 1, col. 1.
3. See H.R. 4855, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. E2045-46 (daily ed. June
16, 1988); see also infra notes 206-08, 224-26, 254, and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 202-05, 209-13, 227-30, 247-53, 255-58 and accompanying text.
5. In March of 1988, a 17-member state attorneys general task force met with sev-
eral car rental company representatives, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Asso-
ciation of National Advertisers to examine proposals aimed at regulating abuses in the
rental car industry. The 17 states represented at this meeting included California, Col-
orado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.
Wade, Task Force Will Draft Guidelines to Reform Car Rental Practices, TRAVEL
WEEKLY, Apr. 4, 1988, at 1.
6. In September and December of 1985, a task force from the National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners met and developed a model state bill to regulate col-
lision damage waivers. The bill was drafted by Tony Schrader, Iowa's deputy
insurance commissioner. Sturken, Officials Move Forward on Bill Regulating Colli-
sion Damage Waivers, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Sept. 23, 1985, at 4.
7. The California State Automobile Association, which represents 2.6 million
drivers, urged legislators to inform and protect lessors about the CDW and supported a
bill that would regulate the CDW. Calif-Auto-Ass'n: Consumer Protection Notice for
California Motor Vehicle Renters Urged by CSAA, BUS. WIRE, July 2, 1986.
8. The Hertz Corporation was the first rental company to ask for regulation of
the CDW. Magenheim, Car Firms Back Move to End CDW, TRAVEL WEEKLY, May 19,
Initially, this comment will present a brief background to help ex-
plain the reasons behind the attack on the CDW. It will then ex-
amine four separate issues that confront proposed regulation of the
CDW: whether the CDW is itself insurance and therefore subject to
insurance regulation;9 whether the CDW is an unconscionable provi-
sion in the rental contract;' 0 whether the CDW plays a part in decep-
tive rental car advertising;" and whether coverage provided by the
CDW is duplicated by one's own car insurance.12 Included within
this discussion will be an analysis of proposed legislation on both fed-
eral and state levels which calls for either regulation or abolition of
the CDW.
II. BACKGROUND
Throughout the 1970's, the cost of the CDW for a daily car rental
was only two dollars.'3 If a lessee declined the CDW protection and
damaged the vehicle, the lessee became liable to the lessor only for
the first $100 worth of damage. 14 On the other hand, if a lessee
purchased the CDW for two dollars per day and was involved in a
collision, the lessor waived its rights to hold the lessee liable for the
$100 deductible. 15 As such, there was only a minor expense if the
CDW was purchased and only a minor risk if it was declined.
However, the CDW's price and its potential for liability have risen
dramatically since the seventies.16 By 1981, the CDW cost about five
dollars a day to eliminate a $500 deductible.17 By 1985, the cost of the
average CDW had grown to eight dollars a day.18 If this eight dollar
1988, at 1. However, firms like Avis and National prefer self-regulation to state inter-
vention. Id
9. See infra notes 48-139 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 140-213 and accompanying text.
11. See itfra notes 214-31 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 232-58 and accompanying text.
13. See 86 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. No. 86-f9 (Dec. 31, 1986) (citing Kramer v. Avis Car
Leasing, Inc., No. 23344/82 (Super. Ct. N.Y. County Apr. 11, 1983), qff'd without opin-
ion, 100 A.D.2d 987, 474 N.Y.S.2d 160, appeal denied, 63 N.Y.2d 605, 471 N.E.2d 462
(1984)); see also Murphy, Renter's Liability, Bus. WK., Sept. 1, 1975, at 6 (citing Avis's
charges for its CDW); Grimes, Practical Traveler: What Price Collision Coverage?,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1985, § 10, at 3, col. 1 (citing 1971 rental car industry figures).
14. Grimes, supra note 13, at 3, col. 1. It should be noted that holding the lessee
liable for the first $100 in damages is equivalent to requiring an automobile owner who
collides with another vehicle to pay the $100 deductible before the insurance company
will pay for remaining damages.
15. Murphy, supra note 13, at 6.
16. Furthermore, some rental car companies are expanding the scope of the
lessee's liability by making the lessee liable for damages arising out of theft or vandal-
ism in addition to the current responsibility for collision-type damages. Fritz, Rent-a-
car Runaround, FORBES, Jan. 11, 1988, at 280.
17. Diamond, supra note 2, at 1, col. 1.
18. Id.
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fee was declined, the customer was facing a $2,500 deductible,19
which represented an increase of $2,000 in customer liability in only
four years. By 1986, the average cost of the CDW ranged from nine
to thirteen dollars a day;20 and, if the CDW was declined, some rental
car companies extended the lessee's liability to include the vehicle's
entire repair cost or replacement value.21 Consequently, the decision
to purchase the CDW has been transformed from a low cost/limited
liability choice into a high cost 22 /unlimited liability choice.23
Meanwhile, the marketing strategies of the rental car companies
have changed over the past fifteen years. During the 1970's, the four
major rental car companies 24 were continually cutting their prices on
rental vehicles in an attempt to capture even greater shares of the in-
dustry's market.25 As a result, lessees benefited financially at the ex-
pense of the companies via low rental rates.26 The policy behind
pursuing greater market share instead of higher profits was related
to the tax incentives in the rental car industry. Leading rental car
companies, which often have a fleet of over 100,000 vehicles,27 gener-
ated huge investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation, pro-
viding valuable offsets to profits earned elsewhere by their
conglomerate owners.28 Thus, any loss of profit was to some extent
recaptured by the tax advantages the rental car industry enjoyed.
However, these advantages were eradicated by the Tax Reform Act




22. "The purchase of the CDW can currently increase the price of a rental by $17
per day or $119 per week." Hertz Calls for Regulation of Damage Waiver Sales Prac-
tices, Bus. WIRE, Mar. 15, 1988.
23. The cost of replacing a rental vehicle can exceed $20,000. Gould, Limiting
Your Liability for a Rental Car, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1987, § 3, at 11, col. 1.
24. The four companies are Hertz, Avis, National, and Budget. Taylor, Why Car
Rentals Drive You Nuts, FORTUNE, Aug. 31, 1987, at 75. These companies account for
95% of the rental car industry market. Hinds, The High, and Secret, Cost of Car
Rental, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1988, at 54, col. 3.
25. Taylor, supra note 24, at 75.
26. An example of the price-reduction wars occurred in Houston, Texas, where




29. See generally Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
30. Section 49(a) of the Internal Revenue Code states in pertinent part: "For pur-
poses of determining the amount of the investment tax credit determined under sec-
tion 46, the regular percentage shall not apply to any property placed in service after
December 31, 1985." I.R.C. § 49(a) (West 1988).
deductions,31 and lengthened the depreciation schedule on rental
cars.3 2 Without these tax shelters, a rental car company suffers a
drain on its cash flow and an inability to increase rental prices with-
out suffering a resulting loss in market share.33 Consequently, most
rental car companies sought other methods of producing revenue34
and began to offer additional coverage options,35 including the CDW;
these additional offerings have since become tremendous money
makers.36
The emphasis on increased profits is reflected by the five to seven
billion dollars in revenue the car rental industry was expected to har-
vest in 1987. This amount representg a twelve to fifteen percent in-
crease from the previous year. 7 Also, the industry's average profit
margin has doubled in the last two years to reach ten to twelve per-
cent.38 A vital contributor to the industry's success is the sales reve-
nue from the CDW, which is estimated to top one billion dollars in
1988,39 as approximately thirty to forty percent of all rental custom-
ers are expected to purchase the CDW.40 Thus, the industry has suc-
cessfully shifted from concentrating on market share to gaining
profit share.
Along with the blessings of success, however, rental firms have
also recently become targets for attack.41 A glaring example is the
Hertz Corporation which admitted to charges by the Justice Depart-
31. I.R.C. §§ 261-280F (West 1988).
32. I.R.C. § 168(e)(3)(B)(i), (g)(3)(D) (West 1988) (five-year recovery period for
automobiles).
33. Fritz, supra note 16, at 280.
34. See, e.g., Fried, Car Rentals: How to Avoid Getting Taken for a Ride, MONEY,
Apr. 1988, at 201-02, 204. The new revenue producers include the following: mileage
charges that can inflate the lessee's bill for each mile in excess of a maximum amount;
charges for additional drivers which can range up to $10 a day; extra charges for rent-
ing outside of airport locations; extra charges for dropping a vehicle off at a site which
is different from the place of purchase; and refueling charges whereby the lessee pays
for gasoline to refuel the tank at a price that doubles the retail price.
35. See, e.g., McGrath, The Trap That Awaits Car Renters, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Nov. 10, 1986, at 73. Some of the available options include the following: per-
sonal-accident insurance on a per diem basis which insures the lessee against acciden-
tal death and a portion of any medical expenses; optional personal effects coverage
which would insure against the loss of luggage and personal effects; and a liability in-
surance supplement which, if taken, would supplement the lessee's liability insurance
coverage to provide greater coverage.
36. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
37. Taylor, supra note 24, at 75.
38. Id.
39. Wolff, Car Rentals: The Unadvertised Extras, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1988, § 4, at
7, col. 1.
40. This figure is estimated by Gerry Entman who is Budget's executive vice-presi-
dent of marketing. Bennett, To Buy or Not to Buy: That's the Issue Over Car Collision
Damage Waivers, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., Aug. 29, 1988, at T18.
41. See Wolff, supra note 39, at 7, col. 1. Dollar was accused of "[using] a contract
that was misleading and deceptive, and prepar[ing] false repair forms," and Avis ad-
mitted to "routinely mark[ing] up its repair charges." Id.
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ment that it had overcharged its customers and their insurance com-
panies for repairing damaged vehicles.42 The company estimated that
it accumulated an additional thirteen million dollars over a seven-
year period by charging its customers retail prices for repair work
done at wholesale prices.43
Besides surcharging its customers, Hertz was also accused of decep-
tive practices, such as forging and altering documents related to esti-
mates and bills for repair.44 Hertz surcharged those customers who
declined the CDW45 as much as two or three times what it actually
paid for the repairs.4 6 Thus, it seems Hertz profited from the CDW
whether it was purchased or declined. Furthermore, on January 1,
1988, Hertz changed the name and use of its own CDW by renaming
it a "loss damage waiver" which now makes the lessee responsible if
the vehicle is stolen or vandalized.47
Because of the tremendous notoriety from increased industry prof-
its, expanding consumer liability, and deceptive practices, the escalat-
ing attacks on the CDW will likely culminate in regulation.
III. COLLISION DAMAGE WAIVER AS INSURANCE
The leading controversy currently associated with the CDW is
whether the CDW falls under the purview of a state's insurance law,
thus exposing the rental car companies to insurance regulation. The
rental car companies claim that the CDW is not insurance48 and that,
instead, it is a contractual "waiver of the rental unit's right to go af-
ter the renter if a car is damaged."49 Nevertheless, consumers, state
attorneys general, and insurance commissioners are now attacking
42. Levine, Hertz Concedes It Overcharged for Car Repairs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26,
1988, § A, at 1, col. 2.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Obviously, those customers who did purchase the CDW and were involved in a
collision were waived from being held liable and therefore were not subject to repair
surcharges.
46. Levine, supra note 42, § B, at 6, col. 1.
47. Wada, Hertz Redefines Damage Waivers to Shift Liability, TRAVEL WEEKLY,
Jan. 4, 1988, at 5.
48. But see Diamond, Car Rental Firms Drive a Hard Insurance Deal, L.A. Times,
May 28, 1985, § 4, at 1, col. 1. Avis puts its vice president for insurance in charge of the
CDW, and National's "Pocket Guide" for consumers places the explanation of the
waiver in the section entitled "What about insurance?" Id.
49. This statement was made by Allyson Fedler who is the press liaison for
Budget. Bennett, supra note 40, at T18.
the CDW as insurance. These attacks have been most significant in
New York and California.
A. New York
1. 1977 Attorney General Opinions
In 1977, the New York Attorney General offered a formal opin-
ion5 0 to the state superintendent of insurance, 51 declaring that the
sale of the CDW was not subject to the insurance laws of New
York.5 2 The opinion stated that, to constitute an insurance contract,
the "agreement must contain an obligation to confer a benefit upon
the party dependent on a fortuitous event."53
The attorney general agreed with rental car firms by holding that
the CDW was only a contractual waiver of rights and that such a
waiver is not insurance.54 The waiver does not fit the statutory defi-
nition5 5 because it does not depend on a fortuitous event,56 i.e., the
damaging of the rental vehicle.57 Instead, the CDW commences after
the option has been selected on a signed rental contract and contin-
ues regardless of whether an accident occurs. Furthermore, the
CDW does not involve the dangers of inadequate coverage, excessive
premiums, and fiscal responsibility, all of which have been the focus
of insurance law.58 Consequently, the selling of the CDW was not
"doing an insurance business" under the insurance statute,5 9 and
therefore, could not be regulated.
However, nine years later, the New York Attorney General6 0 over-
50. 77 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 63 (1977).
51. The attorney general who wrote the opinion was Louis J. Lefkowitz, and the
insurance superintendent at the time was John F. Lennon. Id.
52. See section 1101(a) of the New York Insurance Law which, in the 1977 opinion,
was cited as section 41 of the Insurance Law. Section 1101(a) states in relevant part:
(1) "Insurance contract" means any agreement or other transaction
whereby one party, the "insurer," is obligated to confer a benefit of pecuniary
value upon another party, the "insured" or "beneficiary," dependent upon the
happening of a fortuitous event in which the insured or beneficiary has, or is
expected to have at the time of such happening, a material interest which will
be adversely affected by the happening of such event.
(2) "Fortuitous event" means any occurrence or failure to occur which is, or
is assumed by the parties to be, to a substantial extent beyond the control of
either party.
N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 1101(a)(1), 1101(a)(2) (McKinney 1985).
53. 77 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 63 (1977).
54. Id.
55. See N.Y. INS. LAw § 1101(a).
56. See id, (emphasis added).
57. 77 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 63 (1977).
58. Id
59. Id
60. Robert Abrams, New York's Attorney General in 1986, wrote the opinion. 86
Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. No. 86-f9 (Dec. 31, 1986).
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ruled the preceding opinion61 and held that the selling of the CDW
was subject to insurance regulation.62 The opinion, addressed to the
New York Superintendent of Insurance,63 held that the waiver was
subject to insurance regulation for several reasons.
The opinion compared the CDW to the collision damage insurance
offered by insurance companies and found several similarities64 be-
tween these types of coverage, including the need for regulation.65
The opinion also held that the recent and rapid increase in the
CDW's cost gave rise to the need for regulation to protect the public
against excessive premiums, thus contradicting the prior attorney
general's opinion.66 The opinion also refuted the argument that the
CDW is only incidental to the main rental agreement 67 and not sub-
61. Id,
62. Id.
63. Hertz later brought suit against James Corcoran, the New York Superinten-
dent of Insurance, seeking a declaratory judgment that the selling of the CDW was not
doing business as insurance. Hertz Corp. v. Corcoran, 137 Misc. 2d 403, 404, 520
N.Y.S.2d 700, 700-01 (1988).
64. The opinion stated:
In a contract for collision damage insurance, there is a legal obligation to pay
the cost of repairs for damages to the insured's car, in the event it is damaged.
This obligation occurs at the moment the agreement is completed. Similarly,
the lessor becomes obligated at the time of the CDW agreement to waive any
right to recover from the lessee in the event of damage to the rented car.
Like the obligation in the collision damage insurance contract, this is but one
component of the statutory definition of insurance. In both instances, upon
the occurrence of a "fortuitous event," i.e., damage to the vehicle, the insurer
on the one hand and lessor on the other, is obligated to confer a benefit on the
insured and lessee. The collision damage insurance and the CDW agreement
protect the insured and the lessee, respectively, in relation to a fortuitous
event in which they have "a material interest which will be adversely af-
fected." Without collision damage insurance, the insured would have to pay
the cost of repairs to the insured vehicle. Similarly, without the CDW agree-
ment, the lessee would be liable to the lessor for damages to the leased vehi-
cle. In both cases, in return for a premium, the insurer and the leasing
company, respectively, are assuming the risk that the vehicle will be damaged.
Both transactions are "insurance contract(s)" under the statutory definition.
86 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. No. 86-f9 (Dec. 31, 1986).
65. Id,
66. The 1986 opinion stated that the two dollar cost in 1976 represented eight per-
cent of the total rental cost. However, this figure had increased to eight dollars in
1986, which represents thirteen percent of the rental cost. As such, excessive premi-
ums have become an issue with regulation since the formal attorney general opinion in
1977. Id.
67. Id. (citing Kramer v. Avis Car Leasing, Inc., No. 23343/82 (Super. Ct. N.Y.
County Apr. 11, 1983); see also Truta v. Avis Rent A Car Sys. Inc., 193 Cal. App. 3d
802, 814, 238 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813 (1987) (holding that the primary purpose of car rental
agreement is to rent an automobile and that the CDW option is peripheral to the pri-
mary purpose); Transportation Guar. Co. v. Jellins, 29 Cal. 2d 242, 174 P.2d 625 (1946)
(holding that a contract provision wherein a contractor agreed to insure the vehicles
ject to regulation. The cost of the CDW has increased,6 8 thereby
making the CDW more than just ancillary to the rental contract.69
Finally, the opinion held that the CDW was insurance because the
CDW fees are pooled to pay for the cost of the lessor's risk which
consists of repairs to damaged rental vehicles and that this pooled
risk is essentially the same in the insurance industry.70
2. Attack on the 1986 Attorney General's Opinion
The latter opinion, holding that the CDW is insurance, caused
rental car companies to bring legal action asking the court to declare
that the CDW should remain separate from insurance regulation. In
Hertz Corp. v. Attorney General,71 Hertz was successful in quashing a
subpoena from the New York Attorney General, who was seeking
books and records pertaining to the CDW.72 The attorney general
had commenced an investigation of the CDW pursuant to statute,73
charging that its cost was excessive.74
However, the court quashed the summons for several reasons: the
burden on Hertz to produce millions of files and documents would be
extensive;75 an alleged excessive price charged to the public did not
vest absolute authority in the attorney general to investigate Hertz
without an additional showing that the CDW was unconscionable,
for the owner did not constitute a contract of insurance, and that insurance laws
should not be extended to cover every contract involving an assumption of risk or in-
demnification of loss).
68. See supra note 66.
69. 86 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. No. 8649 (Dec. 31, 1986).
70. Id
71. 136 Misc. 2d 420, 518 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1987).
72. Id at 420-21, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 705. The subpoena sought records and books
which would disclose the following:
(1) the amount of CDW charges collected from each customer in New York
State who rented a car on a short-term basis; (2) the total number of CDW
charges; (3) the total number of cars on which CDW charges were collected;
(4) the number of such cars involved in collisions and all collision reports, re-
pair bills and other documents disclosing the type, extent and costs of repairs
to these cars.
Id. at 422, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
73. See New York Executive Law, section 63(12), which states in pertinent part:
Whenever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or
otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, con-
ducting or transaction of business, the attorney general may apply ... to the
supreme court of the state of New York... for an order enjoining the contin-
uance of such business activity or of any fraudulent or illegal acts, directing
restitution and damages ....
N.Y. ExEC. LAW § 63(12) (McKinney 1982).
74. Hertz, 136 Misc. 2d at 421, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 705. It should be noted that the
court, on the issue of the CDW's cost, assumed its cost to be $2.50 per day. Id. This
figure is far below what the average cost of the CDW was in 1987. See supra notes 20
and 66 and accompanying text.
75. Hertz, 136 Misc. 2d at 423-24, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 707.
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fraudulent, or deceptive; 76 the attorney general did not allege fraud
or illegality;77 the insurance department declined to hold that CDW
was insurance;78 and finally, any price regulation is under the pur-
view of the legislature and/or proper regulatory agency and is not
within the powers of the attorney general.79
The court reached a similar conclusion in Hertz Corp. v. Corco-
ran,80 wherein it held that the CDW was not a contract of insur-
ance.8 1 Hertz sought a declaratory judgment to determine the issue
of whether the CDW is "insurance" within the meaning of the appli-
cable insurance statute,8 2 thereby requiring Hertz to be licensed by
insurance law.8 3
The court distinguished between indemnification, which is the ba-
sis of insurance law, and the CDW.84 Indemnification, as interpreted
by the court, occurs when the "insured is compensated for the actual
property loss sustained by him as a result of the perils insured
against. . ... 85 Meanwhile, a waiver 'occurs when there is a "volun-
tary abandonment or relinquishment of a known right"86 which, in
the context of the CDW, is the waiver of the lessor's right to seek
indemnification from the lessee for collision damage.8 7 In order for
an entity to be subject to insurance regulation, its customers must
have an insurable interest in the vehicle;88 therein lies a primary dif-
76. Id. at 426-27, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
77. Id. at 423, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 707.
78. Id. at 427, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 709. Note that the court is referring to the 1977 at-
torney general's opinion which was issued to the superintendent of insurance. See
supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
79. Hertz, 136 Misc. 2d at 428, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 710.
80. 137 Misc. 2d 403, 520 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1988). Corcoran was the Superintendent of
Insurance for New York and solicited the 1987 attorney general's opinion on whether
the CDW should be subject to insurance regulation. 86 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. No. 86-f9
(Dec. 31, 1986).
81. Corcoran, 137 Misc. 2d at 407, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
82. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101(a)(1) (McKinney 1985) (defines an "insurance
contract").
83. Corcoran, 137 Misc. 2d at 404, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 700..
84. 1d at 404-05, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
85. Id. at 404, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 701 (citing Naiman v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 285 A.D.
706, 708, 140 N.Y.S.2d 494, 496 (1955); McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y.
176, 184, 159 N.E. 902, 904-05 (1928); 29 N.Y. JUR. Insurance § 5 (1963)).
86. Corcoran, 137 Misc. 2d at 404-05, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 701 (quoting Jefpaul Garage
Corp. v. Presbyterian Hosp., 61 N.Y.2d 442, 446, 462 N.E.2d 1176, 1177, 474 N.Y.S.2d 458,
459 (1984)).
87. Corcoran, 137 Misc. 2d at 405, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
88. Id. (citing N.Y. INS. LAW § 3401 (McKinney 1985)). Section 3401 states:
No contract or policy of insurance on property made or issued in this state,
or made or issued upon any property in this state, shall be enforceable except
ference between indemnity and waiver. While an owner8 9 of a vehi-
cle has an interest in insuring his vehicle against collision damage,
theft, vandalism, etc., a lessee of a vehicle does not have the same in-
surable interest.90 As such, the court held it improper to equate in-
demnification with the CDW;9 1 therefore, regulation of the CDW was
inappropriate. 92
The court in Corcoran gave little deference to the recent attorney
general's opinion for three reasons. First, although an administrative
agency's opinion is entitled to great weight,93 "the attorney general is
not the agency administering the regulatory portions of the insurance
law. ... 94 Second, the recent attorney general's opinion contradicts
his predecessor's opinion that the CDW is insurance, and the court,
therefore, did not feel compelled to adopt this present interpretation
of insurance law.95 Finally, the Corcoran court held that it was
bound by precedent to follow the principal that the CDW is not in-
surance96 as set forth in Kramer v. Avis Car Leasing Inc.97
B. California
1. Truta v. Avis: CDW is Not Insurance in California
In Truta v. Avis Rent A Car System, 98 a class action suit was filed
against Avis, Hertz, Budget, and National, the four largest rental car
for the benefit of some person having an insurable interest in the property in-
sured. In this article, "insurable interest" shall include any lawful and sub-
stantial economic interest in the safety or preservation of property from loss,
destruction or pecuniary damage.
89. In this context, an owner of a vehicle includes rental car companies which, by
virtue of owning a fleet of rental vehicles, insures its vehicles similar to an individual
owner of a vehicle.
90. Corcoran, 137 Misc. 2d at 405, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 701. If the lessee is involved in a
collision while driving the rental vehicle, the lessor may be sued as the owner of the
vehicle, thereby necessitating the need for insurance. The lessee is subsequently liable
to the lessor or its insurance company for the damage to the vehicle via indemnifica-
tion if the CDW is declined. I& at 404-05, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
91. 1& at 405, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 701. Furthermore, the court stated:
[It is] irrational ... to say that Hertz, for a [CDW] fee paid by the customer, is
indemnifying Hertz from damage to Hertz' property. But one cannot indem-
nify himself-he merely accepts his own loss-and an agreement whereby
Hertz accepts its own loss is not an agreement of indemnification and there-
fore is not a contract of insurance.
92. Id However, the court also noted that Hertz would be subject to insurance
regulation if, after purchasing collision damage insurance for its rental vehicle, it-then
resold this insurance to its customers.
93. Id. at 406, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 702 (citing Matter of Howard v. Wyman, 28 N.Y.2d
434, 438, 271 N.E.2d 528, 529, 322 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685-86 (1971)).
94. Id.
95. Id
96. 1& at 407, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 702-03.
97. Kramer v. Avis Car Leasing, Inc., No. 23344/82 (Super. Ct. N.Y. County Apr.
11, 1983).
98. 193 Cal. App. 3d 802, 238 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1987).
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companies. 99 The first cause of action in the complaint alleged that
the rental car companies were engaged in the business of insurance
in violation of section 700100 of the California Insurance Code, and as
such, were engaged in unlawful business practices constituting unfair
competition within the meaning of California Business and Profes-
sions Code section 17200.101 The second cause of action alleged that
the defendants were engaged in unlawful business practices because
they were charging excessive rates in violation of the California In-
surance Code.102 As a result, the plaintiff sought an injunction, resti-
tution, and damages in connection with the sale of the CDW.103
In their defense, the rental car companies claimed that the CDW
was only ancillary and incidental to the rental contract, and there-
fore was not insurance. 0 4 To support this contention, the defendants
submitted, from different jurisdictions, four trial court opinions, 0 5
three insurance department opinions, 0 6 and two attorney general
opinions.'0 7 The defendants also relied on a memorandum from the
99. Id. at 807, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 807-08.
100. Id. at 807-08 n.2, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 808 n.2 (citing section 700(a) of the California
Insurance Code). Section 700(a) states:
A person shall not transact any class of insurance business in this State with-
out first being admitted for such class. Such admission is secured by procur-
ing a certificate of authority from the commissioner. Such certificate shall not
be granted until the applicant conforms to the requirements of this code and
of the laws of this State prerequisite to its issue.
CAL. INS. CODE § 700(a) (West 1972 & Supp. 1988).
101. Truta, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 807-08 n.3, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 808 n.3 (citing section
17200 of the California Business and Professions Code). Section 17200 states: "As used
in this chapter, unfair competition shall mean and include unlawful, unfair or fraudu-
lent business practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any
act prohibited by Chapter 1 (commencing with section 17500) of Part 3f Division 7 of
the Business and Professions Code." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1987).
102. Truta, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 808, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 808 (citing section 1852 of the
California Insurance Code). Section 1852 states: "[N]o rate shall be held to be exces-
sive unless . .. such rate is unreasonably high for the insurance provided and . .. a
reasonable degree of competition does not exist in the area with respect to the classifi-
cation to which such rate is applicable." CAL. INS. CODE § 1852 (West 1972).
103. Truta, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 809 n.4, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 809 n.4 (citing Burrell v. Avis, No. 83-6162 C-7
(Fla. Cir. Ct., June 21, 1984); Russell v. Hertz Co., 82 CH 6632 (Cook, Ill. Cir. Ct., Feb.
28, 1983); Klein v. National Car Rental, No. 22720/82 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Spec. Term, May
4, 1983), aff'd, 100 A.D.2d 987, 474 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1984), appeal denied, 63 N.Y.2d 605,
481 N.E.2d 462, 481 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1984); Korn v. Avis, No. 1670 (Pa. Ct. of C.P., Phila-
delphia County, Feb. 10, 1977)).
106. Opinions from the North Carolina Insurance Department, the Texas State
Board of Insurance, and the Insurance Department of Iowa were included. Truta, 193
Cal. App. 3d at 809 n.5, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 809 n.5.
107. Opinions from the Florida Attorney General and the New York Attorney Gen-
California Department of Insurance which concluded that the CDW
did not provide insurance. 108
In determining the insurance issue, the court first looked to the
statutory definition of insurance embodied in the insurance code
which states that "insurance is a contract whereby one undertakes to
indemnify another against loss, damage, or liability arising from a
contingent or unknown event."109 This statute has basically two ele-
ments.110 The first element, according to the California Supreme
Court, involves "a risk of loss to one party and a shifting of that risk
to another party."l" The CDW meets this element because the
lessee could be liable to the lessor for any collision damage to the
rental vehicle; but, because of the waiver purchase, the risk of loss is
transferred to the lessor.
The second element of an insurance contract is "a distribution of
risk among similarly situated persons."" 2 The CDW fulfills this ele-
ment because the risk of loss can rest upon either the lessee or the
lessor, depending on whether the CDW is declined or purchased.
However, the court in Truta refused to limit its inquiry to the ele-
ments listed above" 3 and referred to other criteria to determine
whether the CDW was subject to insurance regulations.114
2. Arguments Against Insurance Regulation
The Truta court, aside from the statutory definition of insurance,
alluded generally to three related arguments favoring insurance reg-
ulation of the CDW: the CDW is only a peripheral part of the rental
agreement; it does not involve the same risks protected against by in-
surance law; and insurance law was not formulated to encompass
every situation involving risk-transferring.
eral were included. Id For the New York Attorney General's opinion, see supra notes
50-59 and accompanying text.
108. Truta,.193 Cal. App. 3d at 811, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
109. Id. at 812, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 811 (citing CAL. INS. CODE § 22 (West 1972)); cf
N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101(a) (McKinney 1985) whose "fortuitous event" definition is simi-
lar to the language provided in the California Insurance Code. For text of section
1101(a), see supra note 52.
110. Truta, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 812, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
111. Id. (citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 32 Cal. 3d
649, 654, 652 P.2d 426, 428, 186 Cal. Rptr. 578, 580 (1982)).
112. Id.
113. Truta, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 812, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 811. The court stated:
[T]he mere fact that... [the CDW] contains these two elements does not nec-
essarily mean that the agreement constitutes an insurance contract for pur-
poses of statutory regulation. A statute designed to regulate the business of
insurance ... is not intended to apply to all organizations having some ele-
ment of risk assumption or distribution in their operations.
Id. (quoting 12 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7002 (1982) (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added)).
114. See inlfra notes 115-36 and accompanying text.
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In deciding whether a peripheral part of any contract can render
its maker subject to insurance regulation, the Truta court referred to
two California decisions. 15 In California Physicians' Service v. Gar-
rison,n' 6 the supreme court looked at the principle purpose of the
contract to determine whether or not it was insurance and formu-
lated a test to decide this issue.11 7 The test is "whether, looking at
the plan of operation as a whole, 'service' rather than 'indemnity' is
... [the company's] principal object and purpose." ' i s Accordingly, if
the company's principle purpose is service, and not indemnity, it
should not be subject to insurance regulation.
This logic was also found in Transportation Guarantee Co. v. Jel-
lins.ii9 In Jellins, the court held that an incidental provision of the
contract, which has an element of risk distribution or assumption,
should not outweigh all other factors in determining consideration; 2 0
"the line between insurance or indemnity and other types of legal ar-
rangement and economic function becomes faint, if not extinct."' 2'
The Jellins court, as in Garrison, looked beyond the risk factor in-
volved, and instead, focused on the company's principal purpose of
the contract in determining insurance regulation. 22
The Truta court applied this "principal purpose" standard to the
rental car industry and held that the principal object and purpose of
the rental car contract was the rental of the automobile i2 3 and that
the CDW is only a peripheral item in the contract.' 24 The court fol-
lowed the Jellins decision and stated that the CDW, as a secondary
consideration involving risk allocation, should not change the defend-
ants from contracting lessors "into insurers subject to insurance
115. Truta, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 813, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
116. 28 Cal. 2d 790, 172 P.2d 4 (1946). In Garrison, medical services were rendered
to patients who paid monthly membership dues to a nonprofit corporation. Id. The
payments made to the physicians for these services were from a fund created from the
dues received by the nonprofit corporation. Id. The court ultimately held that the or-
ganization was not involved in the insurance business. Id at 811, 172 P.2d at 17.
117. Id. at 809-10, 172 P.2d at 16.
118. Id, at 809, 172 P.2d at 16.
119. 29 Cal. 2d 242, 174 P.2d 625 (1946). For a brief synopsis of Jellins, see supra
note 68.
120. Jellins, 29 Cal. 2d at 248-49, 174 P.2d at 629.
121. Jellins, 29 Cal. 2d at 249, 174 P.2d at 629 (quoting Jordan v. Group Health
Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 247-48 (D.C. Cir. 1939)).
122. Id. The court stated: "The question turns, not on whether risk is involved or
assumed, but on whether that or something else to which it is related in the particular
[contract] is its principal object and purpose." Id
123. Truta, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 814, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
124. Id,
regulation."12 5
A second argument against insurance regulation considered by
Truta is that the sale of the CDW does not involve the risks against
which insurance law was designed to protect. The court made an in-
quiry into the extent to which the CDW and the rental car industry
itself were involved in the perils for which insurance regulation was
fashioned.126 Policies such as maintaining minimum reserves, and
regulating investment and financial operations are designed to pro-
tect the insured or the public from the insurer.127 Regulation should
not apply "where no risk is assumed and no default can exist." 28
The Truta court held that there was no public interest to protect be-
cause with the CDW the lessor does not pay out money to anyone,
but instead, agrees not to hold the lessee liable.129 Consequently, the
CDW does not create the risks that insurance regulation seeks to
monitor because there is no need to require accumulated reserves to
pay off claims, and the solvency of the lessor does not affect the pro-
visions of the CDW.130
The final argument against insurance regulation of the CDW is
that insurance was not formulated to encompass every situation of
risk-transferring.i3 1 Nearly every business venture entails some
risk,132 including the rental car industry which operates with the
constant risk of damage to its vehicles by its customers and the public
alike. However, the small risk involved with the CDW does not con-
clusively demonstrate that it should be subject to insurance regula-
tion. 3 3 If viewed otherwise, insurance regulation would engulf every
contract that included some degree of assumption or distribution of
risk.34 Accordingly, the rental contract, with its limited amount of
risk from the CDW, should not be Subject to insurance regulation.13 5
The court in Truta, for the above-stated reasons, held that the
CDW contained in rental car agreements is not an insurance contract
for purposes of statutory regulation.1 36 Consequently, since the de-
125. Id,
126. Id at 812-13, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 812 (citing R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 8.2(c)
(1971).
127. California Physicians' Serv. v. Garrison, 28 Cal. 2d 790, 810, 172 P.2d 4, 17
(1946).
128. Id.
129. Truta, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 813 (discussing the California
Department of Insurance's interpretation of the insurance law).
130. Id
131. Truta, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 812, 238 Cal. Rptr. 811-12 (citing KEETON, supra note
126, at 552).
132. Truta, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 813, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
133. Id. at 812, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 811, 812 (citing R. KEETON, supra note 126, at 552).
134. Transportation Guar. Co. v. Jellins, 29 Cal. 2d 242, 249, 174 P.2d 625, 629 (1946)
(citing Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 247-48 (D.C. Cir. 1939)).
135. Truta, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
136. Id
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fendants were not involved in the business of insurance, no cause of
action could be stated under sections 700137 and 1852138 of the Cali-
fornia Insurance Code.139
Although the attack on the CDW as an insurance contract has
failed so far in both New York and California courts, future attacks
based on this issue are likely. As with the New York Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion in 1986, which reversed his predecessor's opinion and
held that the CDW was insurance, it would not be surprising to see
judges and legislators find that the CDW is subject to insurance regu-
lation if its price continues to increase along with the lessee's liability
when the CDW is declined.
IV. COLLISION DAMAGE WAIVER AS UNCONSCIONABLE
The second area of attack against the CDW is predicated on the
ground that it is an unconscionable term of the rental car contract.
Unconscionability has been defined as "a contract which no man in
his senses, not under delusion, would make, on the one hand, and
which no fair and honest man would accept on the other."140 The
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) includes a provision invalidating
unconscionable terms in contracts for the sale of goods.141 However,
article two of the UCC does not directly apply to the CDW in rental
contracts because renting a car involves a service. Consequently, one
must look to case law to determine the unconscionability of the
CDW.
Courts have identified several factors in determining whether a
term or the whole contract is unconscionable: inequality of bargain-
137. See CAL. INS. CODE § 700 (West 1972 & Supp. 1988). For text of section 700, see
supra note 100.
138. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1852 (West 1972). For text of section 1852, see supra note
102.
139. Truta, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 816, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
140. See Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 410 (1889).
141. Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code states:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reason-
able opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and
effect to aid the court in making the determination.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1982).
ing power between the parties; 142 excessive price;143 fraud, deception,
or coercion;14 4 oppression; 145 standardized agreement executed by
parties of unequal bargaining strength;146 lack of opportunity to read
or become familiar with the document before signing it;1 4 7 use of fine
print in the portion of the contract containing the provision;148 ab-
sence of evidence that the provision was commercially reasonable or
should reasonably have been anticipated;149 the terms of the contract,
including substantive unfairness;150 the relationship of the parties;' 5 '
and finally, all other circumstances surrounding the formation of the
contract, including its commercial setting, purpose, and effect.15 2
Charges of unconscionability concerning CDW have fallen within
two general areas of litigation. First, unconscionability is used as a
sword in an attempt to get damages or other types of relief. Second,
unconscionability is used as a shield against lessors who attempt to
hold the lessee liable for damages to the rental vehicle.
A. The Sword of Unconscionability
1. Applicable California Statutes
In Truta, the plaintiff charged that the CDW was unconscionable
on five separate theories 5 3 and sought injunctive relief, restitution,
142. Hertz Corp. v. Attorney General, 136 Misc. 2d 420, 424, 518 N.Y.S.2d 704, 707
(1987). See, e.g., Graziano v. Tortura Agency, 78 Misc. 2d 1094, 359 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1974);
Triple D & E, Inc. v. Van Buren, 72 Misc. 2d 569, 339 N.Y.S.2d 821, aff'd, 42 A.D.2d 841,
346 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1972).
143. See Hertz, 136 Misc. 2d at 425, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 708.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 426, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 709.
146. See, e.g., A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr.
114 (1982); Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr.
172 (1962); Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986); Steinhardt v. Rudolph, 422
So. 2d 884 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
147. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Steven, 58 Cal. 2d at 877-78, 377 P.2d at 294-95, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 182-83; Davis, 712
P.2d at 991; Steinhardt, 422 So. 2d at 892.
148. See, e.g., Williams, 350 F.2d at 449; A & MProduce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 486, 186
Cal. Rptr. at 122; Davis, 712 P.2d at 991; C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co.,
227 N.W.2d 169, 179 (Iowa 1975).
149. See, e.g., A & M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 488, 186 Cal.Rptr. at 123; Davis,
712 P.2d at 991; C & J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 181.
150. See, e.g., Williams, 350 F.2d at 449-50; Davis, 712 P.2d at 991; Steinhardt, 422
So. 2d at 893-94; C & J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 181.
151. See, e.g., A & MProduce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 486-87, 186 Cal.Rptr. at 122; Davis,
712 P.2d at 991; C & J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 181.
152. See, e.g., Williams, 350 F.2d at 450; A & M Produce, 135 Cal. App. 3d at 489-90,
186 Cal. Rptr. at 123-24; Davis, 712 P.2d at 991; C & J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 181. For
a discussion on factors relevant to unconscionability, see generally RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981); Annotation, Doctrine of Unconscionability as Ap-
plied to Insurance Contracts, 86 A.L.R. 3D 862 (1972); Annotation, "Unconscionability"
as Ground for Refusing Enforcement of Contract for Sale of Goods or Agreement Col-
lateral Thereto, 18 A.L.R. 3D 1305 (1968).
153. Truta v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. 193 Cal. App. 3d 802, 817 n.ll, 238 Cal.
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and damages. 154 The defendants demurred to the charge of uncon-
scionability on the premise that it can be used only as a defense to
enforcement of the CDW and not as a ground for affirmative
relief.155
The court first looked to the applicable California statutes which
govern unconscionable provisions in contracts. 156 Section 1770 of the
California Civil Code provides that inserting an unconscionable pro-
vision in a contract is an unlawful method of competition and an un-
lawful act or practice in a sale or lease to consumers.15 7 Also, section
1780 allows a consumer who is harmed by an unconscionable contract
to recover actual damages, obtain an injunction, receive restitution,
and be awarded punitive damages. 15s Furthermore, section 1670.5,
enacted by the legislature in 1979, contains the exact language of sec-
tion 2-302 of the UCC,159 and has been applied to all contracts rather
Rptr. 806, 815 n.11 (1987). The five separate theories were summarized by the court as
follows:
[Tihe CDW ... provides no protection for most circumstances, a fact which
the defendants concealed; its cost is excessive within the meaning of the Cali-
fornia Insurance Code and far in excess of a price that would be determined
in a competitive business environment; the CDW has misleading language; the
manner in which the rental contracts are printed, worded, packaged and
presented disguises the existence of a major portion of the contractual provi-
sions; and defendants obtained unfair advantage by use of their superior bar-
gaining position.
Id. at 808, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 809 (numbers omitted).
154. Id. at 809, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
155. Id. at 817-18, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16.
156. Id.
157. See California Civil Code section 1770(s) which states: "The following unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any
person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods
or services to any consumer are unlawful: ... [ ] (s) Inserting an unconscionable provi-
sion in the contract." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770(s) (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
158. See California Civil Code section 1780(a) which states:
Any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employ-
ment by any person of a method, act, or practice declared to be unlawful by
section 1770 may bring an action against such person to recover or obtain any
of the following:
(1) Actual damages, but in no case shall the total award of damages in a
class action be less than one thousand dollars ....
(2) An order enjoining such methods, acts, or practices.
(3) Restitution of property.
(4) Punitive damages.
(5) Any other relief which the court deems proper.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(a) (West Supp. 1989) (italics indicate changes or additions by
amendment).
159. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1982).
than being limited to sales transactions.160 Therefore, the defend-
ant's contentions that unconscionability can only be used as a shield
is negated by the legislature's approval of allowing damages and in-
junctive relief when a consumer has been injured by an unconsciona-
ble contract. 161 The test to be applied in such circumstances is
whether "the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconsciona-
ble under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract."'162
2. Procedural and Substantive Aspects of Unconscionability
The Truta court next focused its attention on the procedural and
substantive aspects of unconscionability in a contract setting. The
procedural aspects of unconscionability relate to the following: defi-
ciencies in the contract formation because "of deception or a refusal
to bargain over contract terms";163 oppression, which "arises from an
inequality of bargaining power"; "an absence of meaningful
choice";16 4 and surprise, which involves the extent of allegedly
agreed-upon terms that are hidden in a form contract drafted by the
party seeking to enforce the contract provision.165 On the other
hand, the substantive aspect of unconscionability involves the actual
contract provisions themselves and whether they are unreasonably
favorable to one party, such as "[u]nexpectedly harsh terms mani-
fested in the form of price disparity."16 6
The Truta court then applied the procedural and substantive ele-
ments of unconscionability to the plaintiff's five separate allegations
of unconscionability.167 The plaintiff's first theory was a substantive
allegation that the CDW provides no protection in most circum-
stances-a fact which the defendants concealed. 168  However, the
court held that this was an insufficient claim as a matter of law.169
The plaintiff's second allegation of unconscionability was based on
160. See A & M Produce v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 485, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114,
121 (1982).
161. Truta v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. 193 Cal. App. 3d 802, 818, 238 Cal. Rptr.
806, 815, 816 (1987).
162. Id at 819, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
163. Id. (citing 15 J. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1763A
(3d ed. 1972) (footnotes omitted).
164. Truta, 193 Cal. App. 3d at 819, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 816 (quoting A & M Produce
Co. v. FMC Corp., 35 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (1982).
165. Id
166. Id (quoting J. WILLISTON, supra note 163, at 213-15.)
167. Id at 820, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 817-18. For a synopsis of the five separate theories,
see supra note 153.
168. Id. at 817 n.11, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 815 n.11.
169. Id. at 820, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 817. The court had already ruled that the plaintiffs'
third cause of action for fraud did not state a cause of action and, as such, this allega-
tion of unconscionability was meritless. Id
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two elements,170 the latter of which was that the price of the CDW
was excessive relative to what it would be in a competitive business
environment.171 The court held that this allegation was sufficient to
raise an actionable claim of substantive unconscionability because of
the price disparity between the CDW and the amount of potential
loss as well as the excessive price being unreasonably favorable to the
lessor.172 Consequently, this allegation of unconscionability, based on
excessive price, was sufficient to survive the defendant's general
demurrer.173
The third allegation of substantive unconscionability, that the
CDW' contained misleading language, was held to be without merit
because the court had already denied a cause of action for misrepre-
sentation based on this same misleading language premise. 74 The fi-
nal two allegations were based on procedural unconscionability, and
one of these allegations had to be proven to coexist with the substan-
tive aspect for the cause of action to survive.175 The allegations that
the defendants obtained unfair advantage by use of their superior
bargaining position and the contract's nonnegotiable terms provided a
sufficient basis to afford the plaintiff affirmative relief.176
The impact of the Truta holding is that the defendants may be held
liable for actual monetary damages by having an unconscionable pro-
vision in the rental contract, to wit, the CDW. Such a finding could
establish severe liability upon the rental car firms since they receive
170. Id. at 817 n.11, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 815 n.11. The first element was based on an
excessive price within the Insurance Code. However, since the court held that the
CDW was not subject to insurance regulation, this allegation failed to state an actiona-
ble claim. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 820-21, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 817. The court stated:
[P]lainfiff paid $6 per day for a waiver for collision or upset damage or loss up
to $1,000; that on an annualized basis the rates charged are more than double
the amount of "insurance" provided and are unreasonably high; that no com-
petition exists with respect to the "insurance" provided by each defendant
since each is the sole supplier of the CDW for its rentals.
I& The figures mentioned by the court would result in the plaintiff paying $2,190 an-
nually (i.e., $6 per day for one year) to cover a potential loss of $1,000.
173. Id. at 821, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
174. Id
175. Id at 821, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
176. Id. The court cautioned that it was not holding that the CDW was in fact un-
conscionable. Rather, it merely found that the allegation was sufficient to survive a
general demurrer. Id As such, this cause of action was remanded to the trial court to
determine whether the CDW was unconscionable under California Civil Code section
1670.5(b). Id.
over one billion dollars per year from the CDW sale. 177 Further-
more, a finding of unconscionability could lead courts to enjoin the
rental car companies from selling the CDW. However, the Truta de-
cision was based on a statute which expressly granted affirmative re-
covery in cases of unconscionability and did not limit its use as only a
defense against enforcement of the contract.
B. The Shield of Unconscionability
In Super Glue Corp. v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.,178 a class ac-
tion was brought seeking damages, and declaratory and injunctive re-
lief for unfair trade practices, including the sale of the CDW.179 The
plaintiff alleged that the charges of the CDW and the methods by
which they were computed were unconscionable and thus in violation
of section 2-302 of the UCC.180
However, the court quickly denied this claim because section 2-302
does not create a cause of action allowing a party subject to an uncon-
scionable contract to recover damages.1s1 Furthermore, the court
stated that under the UCC and common law a court can only refuse
enforcement of the unconscionable contract or clause.182 As a result,
the court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the unconscionabil-
ity claim. 8 3
As stated in Super Glue, a plaintiff may use the doctrine of uncon-
scionability as a shield against lessors who try to enforce certain pro-
visions of an unfair rental car agreement. 8 4 Such was the case in
Automobile Leasing & Rental, Inc. v. Thomas,18 5 wherein the plain-
tiff rental car company sought to recover for damage to the rental car
due to the defendant lessee's negligence.' 8 6 The lessee purchased the
177. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
178. 132 A.D.2d 604, 517 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1987).
179. Id. at 604, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 765-66. The plaintiff alleged that the company's
practices of including a refueling charge and a penalty for a late return of the rental
vehicle were also unfair and deceptive business practices. Id at 604, 516 N.Y.S.2d at
766.
180. Id. For the text of Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302, see supra note
141.
181. Super Glue, 132 A.D.2d at 605-06, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 766. The court stated, "The
doctrine of unconscionability is to be used as a shield, not a sword, and may not be
used as a basis for affirmative recovery." Id. (citing Pearson v. National Budgeting
Sys., 31 A.D.2d 792, 297 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1969); Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. PSI Cosmetics,
125 Misc. 2d 68, 478 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1984); Vom Lehn v. Astor Art Galleries, 86 Misc. 2d
1, 380 N.Y.S.2d 532 (1976)).
182. L at 606, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 766 (citing Cowin Equip. Co. v. General Motors
Corp., 734 F.2d 1581 (11th Cir. 1984); Pearson, 31 A.D.2d at 793, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 60;
U.C.C. § 2-302)).
.183. Id. at 605, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
184. Id. at 606, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
185. 100 Nev. 261, 679 P.2d 1269 (1984).
186. Id. at 262, 669 P.2d at 1269-70. The lessee was struck from behind while mak-
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CDW which waived all liability claims against her, "provided that the
car was used in conformity with [the] rental agreement."187 After
the lessee's accident, the lessor sought recovery alleging that the
lessee violated the terms of the contract by not returning the vehicle
in the same condition as when received and by driving it in an unlaw-
ful manner as evidenced by the traffic citation, thereby nullifying the
CDW.188
However, the Nevada Supreme Court viewed the lessor's interpre-
tation as limiting the effectiveness of the CDW to apply only in those
instances where damage was caused by a third party, especially be-
cause this limitation was not apparent from either the face of the
rental agreement or from the reverse side.89 Furthermore, the court
stated that the test to be applied in determining the scope of the
CDW was not what the insurer intended by his words, but rather
what the ordinary reader and purchaser would have understood
them to mean.190 Consequently, the court held that upon purchasing
the CDW the ordinary consumer would believe that he was absolved
from liability, regardless of fault.19'
A similar conclusion was reached in Davis v. ML.G. Corp.,192
wherein the plaintiff lessor sought to recover for damage to the
rental vehicle from the defendant lessee who had driven the car into
a utility pole while intoxicated.193 The lessee had purchased the
CDW194 which also had a number of restrictions that limited its ap-
plicability, including driving under the influence of drugs or
intoxicants.195
The Colorado Supreme Court looked at the limiting language of
the contract versus the lessee's reasonable understanding of the
scope of the CDW.196 The court reversed the appellate court decision
and held that the CDW in the rental contract "was significantly re-
ing a left turn from an improper position for which she received a citation. Id at 262,
679 P.2d at 1270.
187. Id
188. Id
189. Id. at 263, 679 P.2d at 1270-71.
190. Id. at 263, 679 P.2d at 1271 (quoting Elliot Leases Cars, Inc. v. Quigley, 118 R.I.
321, 326, 373 A.2d 810, 812 (1977)).
191. Thomas, 100 Nev. at 263, 679 P.2d at 1271.
192. 712 P.2d 985 (Colo. 1986).
193. Id. at 987.
194. Id. at 986. Actually, the lessee purchased a "physical damage waiver" which is
analogous to the CDW. See supra note 1.
195. Id. at 986-87.
196. Id at 989.
stricted in an unconscionable manner."97 In doing so, the court cited
numerous factors which displayed the unconscionable limitation
upon the scope of the CDW.198 Other cases' 99 are in accord in using
unconscionability as a defense to enforcement of contract terms
which severely limit the scope of the CDW because "[t]he exceptions
swallow the protection." 200
C. Legislation Aimed at the Unconscionability Aspect of CDW
Aside from statutes which prohibit unconscionability in general,201
legislation has been aimed at requiring the lessor to make the provi-
sions of the rental agreement more distinct. For example, language
contained in a New Mexico insurance statute,20 2 which became effec-
tive on June 19, 1987, requires that "[a]ny rental car company offer-
ing for sale insurance coverage or collision damage waivers shall state
clearly on the front page of the rental contract that the purchaser of
the ... [CDW] may be covered ... on his personal motor vehicle in-
surance policy . "..."203 A similar provision is found in a Minnesota
automobile statute204 which states that when a vehicle is rented in
Minnesota, "the rental contract . . . must contain a separate written
notice in at least 10-point bold type, if printed, or in capital letters, if
typewritten .... -205
In June of 1988, Representative Charles Schumer of New York in-
197. Id. at 992.
198. Id. The following factors led the court to view the contract as unconscionable:
(1) the contract was offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; (2) the lessee's intention of
relieving himself from all liability when purchasing the CDW; (3) a normal person
purchasing the CDW would believe that he is covered for a collision regardless of be-
ing under the influence of alcohol; (4) the lessor's agent had never seen any customers
read the reverse side of the agreement; (5) the limiting exceptions to the CDW were
never brought to the lessee's attention; (6) the combination of the color and size of
print inhibits reading the back side of the contract; and (7) the small print and type of
form was evidence that the lessor was trying to discourage persons from reading the
back of the form. Id.
199. See, e.g., Par Truck Leasing Inc. v. Bonanza, Inc., 425 F.2d 695 (10th Cir. 1970)
(collision damage insurance valid to cover lessee where no carelessness exceeding ordi-
nary negligence shown); National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Council Wholesale Distrib.,
Inc., 393 F. Supp. 1128 (M.D. Ga. 1974) (lessor financially responsible for collision
losses despite CDW); Union County U-Drive-It v. Blomely, 46 N.J. Super. 92, 133 A.2d
428 (1957) (renter of automobile liable only for deductible amount); Elliot Leases Cars,
Inc. v. Quigley, 118 R.I. 321, 373 A.2d 810 (1977) (insurance interpreted according to
view of ordinary person); Val Preda Leasing, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 540 A.2d 648 (Vt. 1987)
(unconscionable damage .provision in rental contract unenforceable).
200. Rodriquez, 540 A.2d at 652.
201. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1770, 1780 (West Supp. 1989).
202. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-32-20 (1987).
203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.48(5a)(f) (West Supp. 1989).
205. Id.
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troduced a bill206 in the United States House of Representatives
which was generally aimed at the abuses associated with the CDW.
Section one of the bill, entitled "Disclosure of Information Concern-
ing Collision Damage Waivers," contains the following language:
"Any commercial lessor of automobiles shall, verbally and in promi-
nent writing on the face of the rental agreement, inform any lessee or
prospective lessee of . .. [ ] (1) the optional nature of any collision
damage waiver offered under the terms and provisions of the agree-
ment . *..."207 Furthermore, any violation of the bill could bring
about private civil actions, civil penalties, and injunctive relief.20 8
In California, a bill to add section 1936 to the Civil Code was intro-
duced to govern the rental of passenger vehicles and to limit the lia-
bility incurred by the renter of a passenger vehicle.209 One section of
the proposed bill is specifically aimed at the unconscionability aspect
of the CDW which provides that "every [CDW] shall provide or ...
be deemed to provide that the renter has no liability for any damage,
loss, loss of use, or any cost or expense incident thereto."21 0 Further-
more, the bill states, "every limitation, exception or exclusion to any
damage waiver is void and unenforceable."211 Much like the New
Mexico and Minnesota statutes, the California bill provides for more
distinct language and type face in the selling of the CDW.212 If any
provisions in the bill are violated, the customer is afforded a private
cause of action for recovery of damages, appropriate equitable relief,
and the prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees and costs. 213
As one can see from the recently enacted and proposed legislation,
206. H.R. 4855, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. E2045-46 (daily ed. June 16,
1988).
207. Id. at E2046 (emphasis added).
208. Id.
209. A.B. 3006, Cal. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1988).
210. Id. § 1(e)(1).
211. Id. § 1(e)(2) (emphasis added) (subsection (f) lists the exception to this rule).
212. Id. § 1(g)(1).
A rental company which offers or provides a damage waiver for any consid-
eration in addition to the rental rate shall clearly and conspicuously disclose
the following information in the rental contract or holder in which the con-
tract is placed and, also, in signs posted at the place, such as the counter,
where the renter signs the rental contract: (A) the nature of the renter's lia-
bility, e.g., liability for all collision damage regardless of cause, (B) the extent
of the renter's liability, e.g., liability for damage or loss up to a specified
amount ... (E) the renter may purchase an optional damage waiver to cover
all liability subject to... [the] exceptions permitted under subdivision (f), and
(F) the charge for the damage waiver.
Id.
213. Id. § 1(m).
the procedural and substantive aspects of the CDW have come under
attack, and its reform in this area is imminent.
V. THE DECEPTIVE ASPECT OF THE COLLISION DAMAGE WAIVER
Another attack upon the CDW charges that the low rates are ad-
vertised to lure consumers into renting a car, only to have this low
rate increased by hidden charges such as the CDW. The blame for
hidden charges in the total rental cost is placed upon smaller rental
companies who, needing a competitive edge, advertise irresistibly low
rates which are later supplemented by allegedly incidental charges
like the CDW.214 Without advertising the superficially low rates,
promoting the actual rental cost of a vehicle, with all of the extras,
would cause a company to lose business in the extremely competitive
rental car industry.215
Nineteen states have enacted or are considering laws that would
make it mandatory to include all hidden or optional charges when
advertising a rate.216 Also, in 1988 the National Association of Attor-
neys General, in a preliminary report, found that many companies'
advertised rates do not reflect extra rental fees. 217 The report recom-
mended that all mandatory charges be included in advertising
rates.218 The attorneys general task force is expected to recommend
state enforcement guidelines which will outline acceptable business
behavior and alert potential violators that they will be sued under
state commercial law.219 The report stated that companies make
their rates seem lower by breaking down their rates into components
such as the CDW.220
The Better Business Bureau in New York estimated that the actual
cost of renting a car for one week in New York City was $49 to $145
more than the advertised price.2 2 ' The bureau said the problem is
nationwide and that many rental car companies, including the indus-
try leaders, do not fully disclose surcharges and various contract limi-
tations in their advertising.222 As an example, a recent Hertz special,
advertised at $99 for a weekly rental, would actually cost $230.95 for
214. Diamond, supra note 2, at 1, col. 1.
215. Wolff, supra note 39, at 7, col. 1.
216. Taylor, Travel and You: Rental-Car Protection Under Fire, L.A. Times, July
24, 1988, § 7, at 19, col. 1.




221. Fried, supra note 34, at 201. The bureau checked out advertised rates which
ranged from $59 to $295 a week. However, after the additional charges, including the
CDW, the actual rental cost ranged from $108 to $439.65. Id.
222. Wolff, supra note 39, at 7, col. 1.
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full protection, an increase of 133% over he advertised price.22 3
A. Legislation Aimed at Halting Deceptive Practices
The surcharges and hidden costs in rental car contracts have
caught the attention of the United States Congress and Representa-
tive Schumer who proposed House Resolution 4855.224 Section 1(b)
of the Resolution states: "If ... [a] lessor advertises any .. .rental,
the advertisement shall include... and (2) if the advertisement spec-
ifies the cost of the automobile rental, specific reference to the cost of
any collision damage waiver."2 25 Any violation of this provision
could bring about private civil actions, civil penalties, and injunctive
relief.226
In California, Assembly Bill 3006 is designed to curb deceptive
practices by limiting the daily cost of the CDW to nine dollars227 and
to provide that "[a] rental company which disseminates in this state
an advertisement containing a rental rate shall include in that adver-
tisement a clearly readable statement of the charge for damage
waiver and a statement that damage waiver is optional." 22 8 Further-
more, the bill states: "A rental company shall only advertise, quote,
and charge a rental rate that includes the entire amount except taxes
and mileage charge, if any, which a renter must pay to hire or lease
the vehicle .... ,229 If any provisions in the bill are violated, the cus-
tomer is afforded a private cause of action for recovery of damages,
appropriate equitable relief, and the prevailing party is entitled to at-
torney's fees and costs. 230
The thrust of the legislation against surcharges is to require rental
car companies to utilize "all-inclusive" pricing which is a price that is
set to include all of the extra costs like the CDW.231
223. Rudolph, Hitting 'Em Where It Hertz; Is Rental Car Coverage a Rip-off?, TIME,
Feb. 15, 1988, at 84.
224. H.R. 4855, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. E2045-46 (daily ed. June 16,
1988). Representative Schumer, while introducing the bill, stated: "Rental agents fre-
quently pressure unknowing vacationers into accepting the unnecessary expense. To
make matters worse, the cost of the collision damage waiver is often obscured by ad-
vertised super low daily rental rates." Id at E2045.
225. Id, at E2046 (emphasis added).
226. Id at E2046. Section 2 is entitled "Enforcement Provisions."
227. A.B. 3006, Cal. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § 1(h) (1988).
228. Id § 1(i) (emphasis added).
229. Id. § 1(1)(i) (emphasis added).
230. Id. at § 1(m).
231. Taylor, supra note 216, at 19, col. 1.
VI. COLLISION DAMAGE WAIVER AS UNNECESSARY COVERAGE
A. Other Available Options
Critics of the CDW charge that agents at rental car companies
often pressure its customers into purchasing the CDW without in-
forming them that their own personal automobile insurance may pro-
vide the same coverage as the CDW.232 A survey of twenty-seven
rental car companies revealed that only four of them indicated to
their customers that the CDW was optional and that the renter's own
insurance might provide equal coverage.233 Furthermore, an esti-
mated sixty percent of all insured motorists are already covered by
their own policies for collision damage to the rental vehicle, although
many are unaware of this fact.234 Even if a renter does have duplica-
tive personal insurance, his driving record may be affected if he gets
into an accident with the rental vehicle, possibly causing his personal
insurance premiums to rise.235
Insurance companies charge the equivalent of $1.30 a day for cover-
age comparable to the CDW236 which is often priced at $9 to $13 per
day.237 The annualized cost of the CDW can range anywhere from
$1,080 to $3,600, which far exceeds conventional automobile insurance
to cover similar damage.238 As a result, the cost of the CDW is often
ten times higher than the cost of what collision coverage should
be.239 Since only a couple of dollars of the CDW pays for the lessor's
insurance, the remaining cost serves to raise the rental rate.240
Lessees who do not have personal automobile insurance, or whose
insurance does not cover rental car damage, may still be protected
because many credit card companies provide supplementary coverage
if they use their credit cards for the rental.24 ' However, with the
232. Grimes, supra note 13, § 10, at 3, col. 1.
233. Taylor, supra note 24, at 74 (quoting a survey done by the Consumer Affairs
Committee of Americans for Democratic Action).
234. Fried, supra note 34, at 201 (quoting J. Robert Hunter, President of the Na-
tional Insurance Consumer Organization); Rudolph, supra note 223, at 84.
235. Magenheim, Those Collision Damage Waivers, Wading Through the Morass of
Insurance Options, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Feb. 28, 1987, at 36.
236. Rudolph, supra note 223, at 84.
237. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
238. Taylor, supra note 24, at 74.
239. Fried, supra note 34, at 201.
240. Gould, supra note 23, § 3, at 11, col. 1 (quoting Sean F. Mooney, Senior Vice
President and economist with Insurance Information Institute).
241. Magenheim, supra note 235, at 36. The American Express Gold card covers
the full value of cars rented anywhere in the world. The Diners Club card provides up
to $25,000 coverage in the United States and Canada. Mastercard and Visa Gold cards
provide full coverage everywhere up to the limit of the credit the lessor has on the
card. Hinds, supra note 24, at 54, col. 1.
Lessees who have a Visa or Mastercard issued by Chase Manhattan Bank get $3,000
worth of collision coverage on rental vehicles. Grimes, supra note 13, § 10, at 3, col. 1.
American Express platinum cards will provide coverage up to $50,000. Fritz, supra
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lessee's liability being increased to cover the full value of the rental
vehicle, a credit card with a $3,000 limit would not provide enough
coverage for its holder.242 Nevertheless, the CDW can be ignored if
the lessee's own insurance provides rental car coverage or if the
lessee pays with a credit card that offers such coverage.243
Many auto insurance companies use a standard policy devised by
the Insurance Services Office which provides full coverage for rental
car damage that is the lessee's fault.244 Conversely, some personal in-
surance policies will not cover a rental car at all unless it is being
used as a replacement vehicle.245 Furthermore, in Massachusetts, the
insurance commissioner issued a statement that automobile insur-
ance policies written in the state did not provide comprehensive cov-
erage for a rental vehicle unless it was being substituted while the
owned car was inoperable. 246
B. Legislation Aimed at Informing Lessees of Duplicative
Insurance Coverage
As a result of the confusion regarding whether one's personal auto
insurance or credit card will provide coverage in a collision damage of
the rental vehicle, several legislatures have enacted or proposed laws
that require rental car companies to disclose the possibility that one's
personal insurance may duplicate the CDW's coverage. For example,
a law2 47 in Minnesota was passed in 1987 which requires that rental
car customers be informed at the rental counter about a law in that
state which provides that any personal automobile insurance must
also cover the rental of a vehicle.2 48 As such, the customer must also
be informed that the CDW may be unnecessary. 249 Furthermore, the
law requires that the CDW cannot be sold unless the lessee is pro-
vided with a written acknowledgment that this consumer protection
notice has been read and understood.250
note 16, at 280. The supplemental coverage provided by American Express is under-
written by National Union Fire Insurance Company. American Express Announces
Car Rental Collision Damage Insurance for Members, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 29, 1987.
242. Magenheim, supra note 235, at 36.
243. Hinds, supra note 24, at 54, col. 3.
244. Grimes, supra note 13, § 10, at 3, col. 1.
245. Id.
246. Wade, The Coverage on Rental Cars, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1987, § 10, at 3, col. 1.




A similar consumer protection notice law2 51 was enacted in 1987 in
New Mexico. This statute requires that any rental car company of-
fering the CDW for sale shall clearly notify the lessee on the front of
the rental contract that he may be covered under his own personal
motor vehicle insurance policy.252 Furthermore, if such personal cov-
erage does exist, the lessee can require that the lessor submit any
claims directly to the lessee's personal insurance carrier, which is re-
garded as the lessee's agent.253
The bill proposed by Representative Schumer in Congress would
require that the lessor of any vehicle inform the consumer both ver-
bally and in prominent writing on the face of the rental contract that
coverage under the CDW may be duplicative of the lessee's automo-
bile insurance policy. 254
In California, Assembly Bill 3006 provides that if any rental car
company sells the CDW it must conspicuously disclose on the face of
the rental contract, and in signs posted at the rental counter, infor-
mation which notifies the customer that his personal insurance may
provide coverage for all or a portion of the lessee's liability, and that
the renter should consult with his insurer to determine the scope of
his insurance coverage.255 Furthermore, this bill forbids lessors from
recovering any portion of a damage claim to a rented vehicle from
the lessee's credit card, nor may it place any debit on the lessee's
card.256
Another bill in California,257 effective January 1, 1989, requires
that any rental car company that leases or rents a motor vehicle can-
not enter into a contract unless it is disclosed to the customer that
the CDW offered may duplicate the customer's own insurance
policy. 258
VII. CONCLUSION
The CDW is in danger of being heavily regulated, through either
new legislation specifically aimed at curbing its abuses or by subject-
ing it to current law which will deter its use. The rental car industry
has been unsuccessful in efficiently monitoring both the CDW's price
and marketing tactics which has left consumers paying money for an
option that is discreetly expensive, limited in its coverage, or useless
251. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-32-20 (1987).
252. I&
253. 1&
254. H.R. 4855, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. E2045-46 (daily ed. June 16,
1988).
255. A.B. 3006, Cal. Assembly, Reg. Sess., § l(g)(1) (1988).
256. Id. § l(k)(1).
257. S. 2464, 1988 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 466 (Deering).
258. Id
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altogether. Consequently, regulation seems imminent, whether it be
through insurance regulation, contractual rights for the consumer, or
measures aimed at preventing the deceptive nature overshadowing
the CDW.
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